Preparing to fight the previous war

OTTAWA—A little more than a decade ago, the status of the Canadian Armed Forces was that of a high-profile, efficient institution. Canada's commitment to the war in Afghanistan was winding down, but while it had lasted, the CAF had developed a training infrastructure focused entirely on preparing the next battle group to rotate into Kandahar. Canadian Forces Base Wainwright was converted into a scale model of the Kandahar province. Afghan interpreters and cultural advisers briefed Canadian combat soldiers on what to expect when they arrived “in-country.” Journalists were hired to play the part of, er, journalists in order to prepare Canadian soldiers for the information war that they were heading into. Trained regular and reserve soldiers could expect to spend up to 12 months preparing for their six-month tour in southern Afghanistan. During winter months when Wainwright, Alta., freezes over, troops were sent to train in California. It literally became an entrenched routine for the Canadian Army. The nature of the warfare in Afghanistan was that of counterinsurgency against a largely illiterate and poorly armed foe. However, their hostility and fanaticism meant that Canadian soldiers could never let their guard down. After the pitch battle of Medusa in 2006 against the Taliban, the insurgents learned that they could not best a NATO force in conventional warfare. From that point forward, they resorted to planting improvised explosive devices, and conducting suicide attacks. When first deployed to Afghanistan in 2002, the Canadian contingent was woefully equipped to fight a counterinsurgency in Central Asia. Despite the fact that we had deployed ground forces to the first Gulf War without desert clothing in 1991, we sent the Airborne Battle Group to Somalia in 1993 without desert clothing, and again we had sent peacekeepers to Eritrea in 2000 without desert clothing. In 2002, the first Canadians to arrive in Afghanistan did so in forest green camouflage, which—for those familiar with the dusty hot climate of Kabul and Kandahar—is an oxymoron. In 2002, our troops originally patrolled the streets of the Afghan capital in open Iltis utility vehicles. The Iltis fleet had been considered so worn out back in 1992 that the Canadian Transport Company attached to the United Nations mission in Cambodia loaded them on flatbed trucks rather than drive them on jungle roads. There was an emergency procurement office opened that same year with a $200-million budget to acquire new light utility vehicles, wheeled (LUVW). However upon the Liberal Party's sweeping victory in 1993, freshly empowered prime minister Jean Chrétien shut down not only the controversial Sea King Helicopter replacement, he also axed the LUVW project. Following successful Taliban suicide-bomber attacks on Canadian Iltis vehicles, the Chrétien Liberals hastily bought a fleet of armoured Mercedes Geländewagens at list price, with no industrial benefits in exchange. Once there was political will—driven by public outrage over our troops' lack of protective equipment—the Liberals suddenly found a way to make it happen. As the Taliban upped the explosive quantity of their IEDs, Canada would replace the Geländewagens with South African Nyala armoured vehicles, which were bought and shipped directly to Afghanistan. When the Kandahar roads still proved vulnerable, Canada sought and bought six heavy-lift Chinook helicopters to keep troops out of danger. These were older “D” model Chinook helicopters, which we purchased directly from the United States air force in theatre. However, Canada also purchased 15 brand-new Chinook “H” models from Boeing. These were delivered after Canada made the decision to withdraw completely from the doomed Afghanistan mission. As such, Canada now possesses an abundance of helicopter heavy-lift capability which would be perfectly suited to waging a counterinsurgency against a poorly equipped foe. Ditto for the M-777 towed Howitzers that we purchased for the Canadian artillery. They are perfect for long-range engagements from static positions against a foe who does not have artillery of their own. Both the Chinooks and the M-777s have no place on a modern battlefield, as witnessed by the ongoing near-peer conflict in Ukraine. Artillery needs to be self-propelled and armoured to protect the gunners from counter-battery fire, while the Chinooks would be flying death traps in an environment laden with sophisticated air defence systems. First-person view (FPV) drones are the new master of the battlefield, yet Canada hasn’t announced any plans to acquire such systems. Nor has Canada yet secured a low-level air defence system to combat FPV drones. The war in Ukraine has also shown that uninhabited maritime drones are steadily sinking the Russian Black Sea fleet. Despite this naval warfare development, Canada continues to proceed with the building of capital warships without announcing any program to procure uninhabited maritime attack drones. Which war exactly are we preparing to fight? Scott Taylor is the editor and publisher of Esprit de Corps magazine. The Hill Times

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Preparing to fight the previous war

The equipment and artillery we’re using have no place on a modern battlefield, as witnessed by the ongoing near-peer conflict in Ukraine.

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