Want submarines? Canada should join AUKUS

The National Shipbuilding Strategy is a long-term project to renew Canada's federal fleet of combat and non-combat vessels. The government formed partnerships with three Canadian shipyards to deliver much-needed vessels to the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard. The strategy provides economic benefits to Canadians, and rebuilds our country’s shipbuilding industry. However, this partnership only addresses surface ships, which does not cover all the needed combat vessels that Canada requires. There is also the need for an additional partnership to take care of the vital requirements for new submarines. One such strategy was recently created by Australia for the acquisition of submarines: AUKUS. AUKUS is a trilateral security partnership for the Indo-Pacific region between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Announced on Sept. 15, 2021, the partnership involves the U.S. and the U.K. assisting Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. The partnership also includes co-operation on advanced cyber mechanisms, artificial intelligence and autonomy, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic, electronic warfare, innovation, and information sharing. The partnership will focus on military capability, distinguishing it from the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance that also includes New Zealand and Canada. Roger Cyr is a retired engineering commander with the Royal Canadian Navy, and a retired civilian NATO liaison officer. Photograph courtesy of Roger Cyr The International Centre for Defence and Security called the AUKUS partnership a powerful statement about the priority of the Indo-Pacific. The government of the People's Republic of China was vocal in its contempt of the partnership, accusing the three western countries of having a "Cold-War mentality," as the partnership was widely seen as being, at least in part, a response to China's status as an increasingly assertive emerging superpower. As part of AUKUS, more than 700 American personnel are to be based in Western Australia. The U.S. Defense Department expects that these personnel will support up to four U.S. nuclear submarines stationed at the Australian Naval Base, HMAS Stirling, where a low-level radioactive waste management facility is also being planned. The plan is that Western Australia will host the first submarines from 2027. Also, radioactive waste from the submarines will be stored at Australian Defence sites including a new management facility in Perth. The projections are contained in comprehensive briefing notes prepared by the newly created Australian Submarine Agency, which also details how a one-off Australian government payment of US$3-billion will be spent by the U.S. in Australia. Under the optimal pathway announced by AUKUS leaders in early 2023, the Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) would first begin hosting British Royal Navy Astute-class and U.S. Navy Virginia-class submarines at the Stirling Base starting in 2027. SRF-West is the first phase of AUKUS and is projected to grow an Australian workforce of approximately 500-700 maintenance and support personnel before the Sovereign Ready milestone when Australia can own and operate its own U.S.-made nuclear-powered boats. The AUKUS concept would be an ideal solution for Canada, since it is now at the threshold of embarking on a major program to acquire replacement submarines. This Australian concept should be copied by Canada for its acquisition of new submarines. It would allow Canada to create and develop expertise in the nuclear-power propulsion submarine operations and maintenance. It would join an elite number of allied countries in this area, and get assistance from expert nations in this field. The possible approach should be for Canada to join the AUKUS group and embark on the creation of a nuclear-powered submarine infrastructure, just as Australia is now doing, and it would establish a project to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. Given the U.S.’s huge interest in the Arctic, such an infrastructure would have to be established on the West Coast. It would create great opportunities for scientific developments and employment that could cumulate in a major financial opportunity for Canada. The Canadian Navy has been seeking to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for generations without success. Back in March 1958, the Navy began reviewing the possibility of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. This led to the creation of the Nuclear Submarine Survey Team (NSST), whose purpose was to investigate the feasibility of nuclear-powered submarines for Canada. The NSST delivered their final report in June 1959, recommending the American Skipjack class as the design of choice, and the acquisition of five of the submarines. The proposal was presented to cabinet suggesting the acquisition of 12 new submarines. However, due to cost, the Navy offered the cheaper alternative of conventionally powered submarines. Cabinet approved the initial proposal in January 1960, but deferred the decision on the type of submarine until March. By August 1960, the nuclear-powered submarine option was passed over for conventionally powered subs. In the end, Canada chose the British diesel-electric Oberon class. In the early 1980s, Maritime Command began a program to replace the aging Oberon subs. Dubbed the Canadian Submarine Acquisition Program, it recommended a building program of four to 12 submarines with under-ice capability. The report was presented to the minister of national defence in 1985 with plans for only conventionally powered submarines. However, the minister requested more information on the possibility of nuclear-powered submarines. The study, named the Nuclear Submarine Option Study, claimed that British or French designs could be built in Canada for approximately $5-billion. This study would shape the policy promoted in the 1987 White Paper on Defence. HMCS Victoria returns from operations with the United States Navy on Feb. 26, 2015. Nuclear submarines have considerable performance advantages over diesel-electric submarines, writes Roger Cyr. DND photograph by LS Zachariah Stopa The proposed nuclear submarines were not well received by some politicians, apparently because Canadian nuclear submarines would upset the balance of power with the Warsaw Pact, and because of the cost. The Treasury Board objected to the program, claiming that the project was run poorly with project costs not developed accurately, especially those tied to infrastructure needs. Members of the opposition focused on the estimated cost of the project, pointing out the steadily increasing size of the federal deficit and debt. The announcement came slightly more than a year after the Chernobyl disaster, prompting fears of similar nuclear incidents even though no submarine accidents involving reactors had occurred in the then three decades of NATO nuclear submarine use. The United States objected to the Royal Canadian Navy having nuclear submarines as part of its fleet, fearing a significant impact to its own submarine operations in North American waters and possible conflict over access to the Northwest Passage. In order to prevent this, the U.S. exercised its rights under two previously signed treaties to block the sale of submarine nuclear reactors by the U.K. to Canada. Also, under a 1959 agreement between the U.S. and Canada, the Americans had the right to block the purchase of submarine nuclear reactors by Canada from France. Attempts to negotiate with the U.S. were initially unsuccessful, as the Canadian defence minister was told in no uncertain terms by the U.S. Department of Defense that a Canadian nuclear submarine program was unnecessary and even unwelcome. Nuclear submarines have considerable performance advantages over diesel-electric submarines. Nuclear propulsion, being completely independent of air, frees the submarine from the need to surface frequently, as is necessary for conventional submarines. The large amount of power generated by a nuclear reactor allows nuclear submarines to operate at high speed for long periods, and the long interval between refuelling grants a range virtually unlimited, making the only limits on voyage times being imposed by such factors as the need to restock food or other consumables. The limited energy stored in electric batteries means that even the most advanced conventional submarine can only remain submerged for a few days at slow speed, and only a few hours at top speed, though recent advances in air-independent propulsion have somewhat ameliorated this disadvantage. It should also be kept in mind that the Government of Caada is committed to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. This goal will require support and engagement from all parts of society, including defence assets. Any nuclear-powered ship emits significantly fewer greenhouse gases and air pollutants. Using nuclear propulsion in submarines to replace diesel engines would significantly reduce emissions. Canada is now looking at replacing its obsolete submarines, and it has apparently expressed interest in joining the AUKUS partnership, which would make good sense. Roger Cyr is a retired engineering commander with the Royal Canadian Navy, and a retired civilian NATO liaison officer. The Hill Times