Arctic disputes won’t all be solved with more arms

Canada’s commitment to modernize NORAD, outlined in Strong, Secure, Engaged, through the Roadmap for a Renewed Canada-U.S. Partnership, and the Joint Statement on NORAD Modernization, explains the government intends to invest $3-billion over six years, starting in 2022-23, into a new continental defence modernization plan. With total planned funding of $38.6-billion over the next 20 years, there could be a significant upgrade to Canadian NORAD capabilities at a significant cost to future generations of taxpayers and Canada’s Arctic. Canada will invest in a new Northern Approaches Surveillance system that expands the Canadian Armed Forces and NORAD’s situational awareness of who and what is entering Canadian airspace from the North. The new Northern Approaches system will replace Canada’s existing North Warning System, which was not designed to detect modern weapons or delivery systems such as long-range cruise and hypersonic missiles. A new Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar system will provide early-warning radar coverage and threat tracking from the Canada-U.S. border to the Arctic Circle, over and beyond the northernmost approaches to North America, including the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Erika Simpson is an associate professor of international politics at Western University, who researches international security issues. Photograph courtesy of Erika Simpson The risk is that NORAD will increasingly mesh with a potential United States Ballistic Missile Defence system in the Arctic at the top of world, to which the Canadian government’s 2017 defence policy review refrained from committing. The Canadian government has yet to announce whether it will participate in the American project, and any new defence review must consider Canada’s options. Meanwhile, Canada recently committed through NORAD to develop a complementary system with the U.S. called Crossbow—a network of sensors with classified capabilities, distributed across Northern Canada—as another layer of detection. But there are less militaristic and less costly ways to assert sovereignty over Canada’s North and enhance world peace. In the wake of the 1969 Manhattan Voyage, then-prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau passed the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Act, and endorsed the 1973 claim that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are internal waters. The emphasis in the 1970s was on preventing and reducing marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas, and preventing major harm to the Arctic’s delicate ecological balance. Canada also used international law in 1986 when it drew straight baselines capturing the archipelago. A more peaceful northern strategy would submit continental shelf claims for international arbitration, and use international law to declare Canada’s Arctic a potential nuclear-weapon-free zone. Arguably, nuclear weapons on submarines operating under Arctic ice contribute to enhancing strategic deterrence. However, too many countries are deploying submarines, like China, India, Russia, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., leading to the greater likelihood of nuclear accidents under Arctic ice. Instead, drones that ceaselessly survey Canada’s Arctic would be safer, inexpensive, and might augment Aurora aircraft that occasionally fly over Arctic territory. Combined with trawlers, coast vessels, and fast boats that belong to our Coast Guard, Canada’s Inuit could continue to reinforce sovereignty by being paid to walk over the snow. However, without much fanfare or public consideration, the Liberal government committed in March 2022 to buy F-35 fighter jets, currently the world’s most expensive single-engine—not dual-engine—aircraft. The $19-billion deal means more peaceful defence options will be jettisoned because the Liberals committed to buy equipment that future generations will have to pay for. The F-35 is highly unsuited for Canada’s needs, and signals the ongoing defence-spending spree the Trudeau Liberals needed to end in 2021. Although Germany decided to buy F-35s to replace its aging Panavia Tornadoes, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II will be an unwise choice because it is a single-engine fighter tasked with patrolling North American airspace—including the vast, unforgiving climate of the Arctic—in co-ordination with the U.S. Notably, the U.S. fields twin-engine F-22 stealth fighters in Alaska. If the F-35 engine fails, nothing can prevent a crash in Canada’s High Arctic. Furthermore, the expensive purchase incurs the danger of further creeping continentalism, and possible entrapment in U.S.-led proxy wars. The rapid pace of climate change, with Arctic ice cover down by millions of square kilometres since 1979, means that mounting threats other than Russia and China need urgent attention. For instance, studies by Canadian and Norwegian scientists show that the Far North is a dumping ground for highly toxic pesticides, DDT, lead, mercury, and radioactive waste. Moreover, the Arctic contains 44 trillion cubic metres of natural gas and 90 billion barrels of oil, representing 30 per cent of the world’s remaining undiscovered gas resources, and 13 per cent of the world’s remaining oil resources. The main routes for shipping oil and gas, like the Northwest Passage, are contentious due to differing claims among eight circumpolar countries that disagree on shared borders, equi-distances, and 200-mile zones. The diesel-electric submarines Canada bought second-hand from the British were never refurbished for Arctic surveillance, only for use in Atlantic and Pacific waters. The EH-101 helicopters were cancelled, as they were too expensive and useless for search and rescue. Now Canada should cancel the F-35 contract; buy more drones and better-suited Super Hornets; and allocate more resources to legal battles among multilateral institutions. Future environmental and legal disputes pertaining to the Arctic will not be ameliorated by threatening the use of improved surveillance, and a potential missile defence system, further equipped with fighter jets and nuclear submarines. Erika Simpson is a professor at Western University; president of the Canadian Peace Research Association; and the author of Addressing Challenges Facing NATO and the United States Using Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Ukraine; NATO and the Bomb; and Addressing Challenges Facing NATO Using Lessons Learned from Canada. The Hill Times