A missed chance to rein in security threats in space leaves us all vulnerable

It’s no secret that political and military tensions over outer space are rising. Recent developments at the United Nations have made this worse. After several worthwhile sessions dedicated to norms, principles and rules for responsible behaviour in outer space, the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) concluded its last session without reaching a consensus outcome, failing even to agree to the most basic procedural description of the meetings. Most blame Russia and a handful of other states, including China, for withholding consensus behind closed doors by imposing unworkable redlines. Publicly, Russia referred to the focus on norms as a “fundamental flaw that proved fatal,” while clearly revelling in this so-called failure. Regardless of where the fault lies, the consequence—a space environment increasingly at risk of armed conflict—threaten us all. Work at the United Nations on negotiating an international agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space has long been immobilized by competing priorities. Among the staunchest supporters of such prevention, Russia has remained focused on a legal ban on the placement of weapons in outer space—a focus that grew out of objections to the Reagan-era so-called Star Wars missile defence program. Meanwhile, most Western states have sought to address threats from ground-based anti-satellite capabilities while resisting restrictions on space technology which they argue would hinder innovation, and be difficult to verify. The upshot is that, despite more than four decades of collective effort, the goal of banning weapons in space remains elusive. Efforts have been hindered by the difficulty in discerning such capabilities and differentiating harms from benefits. A satellite is just a satellite until it is used to do harm. Meanwhile, threats to satellites themselves continue to proliferate. The focus on norms of behaviour at the OEWG was intended to get past this diplomatic logjam. Work began last year to develop a shared understanding of the types of activities and capabilities that states find threatening, and of how perceptions of threat might be mitigated through specific norms of behaviour. The goal was to prevent misunderstandings that might escalate into armed conflicts, either in space or on Earth. Without such a common understanding, we remain plagued by uncertainty, insecurity and mistrust. I had the privilege of contributing to the OEWG, and have witnessed first-hand a wealth of constructive ideas and goodwill being shared among state participants. There was a sincere effort to work toward mutual obligations and restrictions that would mitigate the risk of conflict by making space activities more transparent and predictable. This collegial tone inspired a movement for a moratorium, led by the United States, on destructive tests of direct-ascent anti-satellite capabilities, joined by Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and all members of the European Union. The next step could be a legally binding agreement. Indeed, the OEWG exercise was viewed by participants such as India and Brazil as a stepping stone to future legal agreements on weapons, and as a contribution to the rational, constructive governance of space that differentiates between benign and harmful activities. Unfortunately, those states led by Russia seemed determined to have it fail—at least on paper. The failure to achieve consensus on documentation doesn’t diminish the good work that took place. But it does demonstrate a willful desire on the part of those states obstructing consensus to allow threats in outer space to escalate. The potential consequences are dire. Jessica West is a Centre for International Governance Innovation senior fellow, and a senior researcher at Project Ploughshares, a Canadian peace and security research institute. Handout photograph The global community derives tremendous value from outer space. In Canada, satellites provide a lifeline to northern, remote, and rural communities. And they play a critical part in ensuring national security, especially in the Arctic. The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated anew the importance of satellite communications, imaging, and positioning in war-fighting, for better and worse. But this very utility means that space systems are now seen as targets to be threatened by a growing array of capabilities. Destructive weapons such as anti-ballistic missiles have been demonstrated against space objects by China, India, Russia, and the United States. The means for cyber interference, electronic jamming and directed energy attacks are widespread. Other potential threats may lurk in new and emerging capabilities such as advanced robotics and the ability to manoeuvre and operate in close proximity to—or even physically grapple with—other satellites. These capabilities are used to support innovative in-space services such as satellite refuelling, repair, and active debris removal efforts—but could be repurposed. Moreover, this latest diplomatic failure may accelerate the pursuit of so-called defensive measures in space, fuelling a cycle of fear. Many states operate military space forces, including China and Russia. And there is growing interest in being able to physically guard satellites and pre-empt perceived threats, expressed by France and the United States. The result could be a de facto arms race and a slide into armed conflict: the very outcome that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is trying to prevent. Another round of diplomatic talks, spearheaded by China and Russia, is intended to address elements of a possible legally binding agreement related to weapons, and the use of force in outer space. But failure to co-operate at the OEWG does not bode well, not only because of the buildup of ill will, but also because many ideas from the discussion on norms are necessary building blocks for a more robust arms control agreement. Canada, as a champion of the development of norms—and as the first state to join the U.S.-led moratorium on destructive anti-satellite testing—must now assume a critical role. We must champion individual initiatives, and work with the diverse group of friendly states that came together at the OEWG to give substance to the many practical ideas brought to light. There is no time to lose: humankind’s ability to benefit from outer space is increasingly fragile, and the path to sustained peace increasingly narrow. Jessica West is a Centre for International Governance Innovation senior fellow and a senior researcher at Project Ploughshares, a Canadian peace and security research institute, where she focuses on technology, security and governance in outer space. The Hill Times