PM’s plane saga begs the question: why is the Air Force in the airline business?

OTTAWA—The Royal Canadian Air Force was thrust back into the media spotlight when its CC-150 Polaris aircraft broke down on the runway in New Delhi, India. A faulty part on the 30-year-old Polaris was to blame for the delay, which not only stranded Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, but also his attendant entourage of staff and parliamentary press gallery reporters. As such, this story of minor travel inconvenience quickly ballooned into that of a “national embarrassment” due to our beleaguered RCAF having to operate aging equipment. The coverage of this particular delay led to the revelation that a second RCAF Polaris had been badly damaged in a collision back on July 22. On that occasion, the Polaris was participating in a joint military exercise in the Indo-Pacific, and had delivered cargo to the United States airbase on the island of Guam. The RCAF aircrew had mistakenly left the Polaris only “partially secured,” meaning the crew chief had failed to ensure the chocks were in place beneath the landing gear. According to the after-action report, “At approximately 10:30 local … the aircraft began to roll backwards, nose veering to the left and continued to roll.” The result was a collision with a French air force A400M cargo plane, in which “both aircraft sustained serious damage.” The RCAF’s initial review found no evidence of mechanical failure causing this accident—it was simply human error. That did not stop the usual defence analysts from bemoaning the fact that Canada should have replaced the Polaris fleet years ago. The truth is that with the Polaris fleet’s lifespan set to end in 2027, the Canadian government has already purchased replacement fleet consisting of both new and used Airbus transport aircraft. The first of the new-to-us, used Kuwait Airlines Airbuses actually arrived in Ottawa on Aug. 31. However, as with all fleet transitions, it will take time before the RCAF can successfully retire the existing five Polaris aircraft and begin fully operating the nine new—or newish—planes. In other words, as far as embarrassing Canadian defence procurement tales, this little saga would not even register. In this case, a better question would be why did Canada feel it was necessary to purchase these new aircraft for the RCAF? The truth is that when Canada first announced it was buying five used Airbus A310-300s in 1992, no one was more perplexed than the commanders of the RCAF. Only the year before, the Department of National Defence had announced it was retiring its aging fleet of Boeing 707 passenger planes, and the RCAF was getting out of the airline business. Service Air, as it was affectionately known, was to be replaced with the chartering of Air Canada flights as required. As such, by the time that the Progressive Conservative government of the day announced it was buying five used Airbuses in 1992, the RCAF had already divested itself of the aircrew, personnel, and infrastructure necessary to operate a fleet of passenger jets. The quick purchase had nothing to do with fulfilling a military purpose. Canadian Airlines had purchased the planes in question from Airbus. At that juncture, Canadian Airlines was on the brink of bankruptcy and the five Airbuses were a $500-million liability on its books. This was in turn seen as an impediment to American Airlines stepping in to bail out the struggling Canadian Airlines. The government solved the impasse by buying the five slightly used Airbuses, and American Airlines went ahead and briefly bailed out Canadian Airlines before its inevitable bankruptcy. The RCAF tried to find a useful purpose for its new aircraft, converting some into cargo planes and one into a VIP transport, which was later derided by opposition parties as a “flying Taj Mahal.” Under the latest procurement, the nine new and used Airbus replacements are to have a variety of roles, from cargo to air-to-air refuellers. However, one must go back and revisit the 1991 policy decision that decided the RCAF should not be a quasi-airline. Surely it would be cheaper and a better use of resources for the various government departments, National Defence included, to simply charter the passenger flights on an “as-required” basis? Scott Taylor is the editor and publisher of Esprit de Corps magazine. The Hill Times

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PM’s plane saga begs the question: why is the Air Force in the airline business?

In 1991, the government of the day decided the RCAF should not be a quasi-airline. So why are we still buying it passenger planes?

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