Canada needs to be part of the arsenal of democracy

One thing we learned in the pandemic is “just in time” isn’t good enough. Relying almost exclusively on timely access to offshore suppliers in an emergency proved to be a recipe for failure. Having a degree of built-in domestic industrial capacity is now generally regarded as essential to resiliency, if not national security. A similar lesson is emerging from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine’s success in this war boils down to two basic ingredients. First, the courage, toughness and will of the Ukrainian people. And second, the degree to which NATO governments and their defence industries work together to produce and supply Ukraine with the defence technologies they need, when they need them, and in the quantities required. The Economist calls this building “the arsenal of democracy.” The level of demand from the battlefield is unprecedented since the Second World War. The Ukrainian Army is firing over 5,000 155mm artillery shells daily. The United States alone has provided Ukraine with over one million 155mm rounds. Consequently, the production capacity of the defence industrial bases of NATO states is increasingly seen as decisive in the war. Victory in Ukraine, and ongoing deterrence in Europe and globally thereafter, requires every NATO state, including Canada, to have domestic defence industrial capabilities—comparative advantages—to bring to the collective defence table. Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre’s comments last year calling for the Canadian defence industry to shift to “a wartime footing” are reflective of that basic security reality. Ottawa’s neglect of the Canadian defence industrial base must, therefore, end. In democracies like Canada, defence industries don’t mobilize on their own or through exhortation. They must be guided and shaped through thoughtful government policy and procurement. There must be real partnership and trust between industry and government. The Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries has long advocated for the establishment of a new, institutionalized relationship between the federal government and the Canadian defence industry. The aim would be to work together to plan, grow and sustain a healthy Canadian defence industrial base that can contribute more to our national defence and collective security obligations. As the government works through its Defence Policy Update—launched last year in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine—we will continue to argue for this relationship. The recent debate on defence has centred on the higher order issue of whether Canada will ever meet NATO’s two per cent of GDP defence spending target. At about 1.3 per cent now, we are nowhere near that target, have no plan to get there, and the target itself has been rejected by the prime minister. Nevertheless, given the European security situation and an increasingly assertive China, the case for two per cent is stronger today than when it was agreed to in the Wales Declaration nearly a decade ago. Canada’s failure to meet another key Wales Declaration commitment—spending a minimum of 20 per cent of the defence budget on equipment—is less discussed but no less important. According to the Department of National Defence, in 2021-22, Canada hit 13.7 per cent on this metric. This is not just well below the NATO target. It is the same low level as two decades ago during the tail end of so-called “decade of darkness” for the Canadian Armed Forces. There are many reasons for this perpetual capital spending shortfall, one of which is a sclerotic and overly complex approach to defence acquisitions. Meaningful streamlining and simplifying of the defence equipment acquisition function—informed through a consultative process with the Canadian industry—needs to be a priority in the Defence Policy Update. This, too, will lead to a stronger and more sustainable defence industrial base. It is both trite and true to say the international security environment has changed with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One by-product of the war is that the technology and production capabilities of the defence industries of NATO states are seen today—in a way they were not a year ago—as essential to alliance security and deterrence. Canada’s defence policy update needs to reflect that reality. Nicolas Todd is vice-president of policy, communications, and government relations with the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries. The association represents the interests of more than 700 defence, security, and cyber companies across Canada. The Hill Times