The West’s neglect of Latin American interests will lose them as allies

The June 2022 Commonwealth refusal to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, despite the efforts of Canada's Justin Trudeau and Britain's Boris Johnson, highlighted persisting antipathy with the Western democracies in Africa and the Middle East. This fracture within the global community bodes ill for a future U.S.-China war over Taiwan, the outcome of which will ultimately be determined by whether Washington or Beijing is better able of marshalling the most allies to their cause. Similarly, the June 2022 Ninth Summit of the Americas was broadly judged to be a failure of U.S. diplomacy, with resentment caused by the exclusion of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, but the controversial inclusion of pro-U.S. leaders of Haiti and Bolivia. American protectionism and isolationism is largely seen to be driving the absence of U.S. regional proposals on trade, immigration, and development. The rise of China as an export market for Latin America goods has reduced U.S. and Western influence, undermined hemispheric integration, and is the basis for a more positive sentiment towards Russia. As if the economic tensions between the U.S. and Europe on one side, and U.S. and China on the other, in addition to the COVID pandemic were not enough to derail Latin America's economic growth plans conceived for 2019-20, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the region faces a significant reduction in economic activity. This threatens the security of countries both inside and outside the region, like Canada. COVID measures significantly reduced export demand, disrupted fragile international production and supply chains, resulting in asymmetric recovery in job creation in Latin America, and significant inflation in sectors that touch national security. In other words, “more of the same” looms on the horizon: high levels of inequality, poverty, insecurity, internal violence, and even bigger challenges for the governments of a region, characterized by historic, extractive economic policies that only accentuate the current problems. A pale economic growth in average of 1.8 per cent in 2022 is the best projected scenario for the region, but the current trend shows differently: a return to the slow growth pattern of 2014-19 of only 0.3 per cent annual average, as well as regional inflation that will go from 6.6 per cent in 2021 to 8.1 per cent in 2022. These conditions will translate into increased poverty from 29.8 per cent in 2018 to 33.7 per cent in 2022, and augmented extreme poverty (misery) from 10.4 per cent in 2018 to 14.9 per cent this year. Out of the region's 650 million inhabitants, 7.8 million are going to fall into food insecurity imminently, joining the already 86.4 million people who already face this reality. This announced economic deceleration could be seen as a localized problem of Latin America, but it is not. Canada is one of the countries that will pay a price for this added slowdown if appropriate measures are not adopted. To be more precise: a systemic scarcity of energy sources, food, products, jobs, and inflation in Latin America essentially means two things for Canada (and also the U.S.): a) higher rates of migration to the North from the South, and b) augmented economic pressures. The governments of Latin America should work together (historically, a challenge in the region) to implement common measures to counter the approaching new reality. They must try to avoid creating conditions in which one country disrupts the status quo of its neighbours. For example, creating internal migration of desperate (or undesirable people), as the recent Venezuelan case of around six millions of refugees and migrants illustrates. The last time that a significant economic co-operation pact took place was in 2014, when the leaders of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru met to make official the “Pacific Alliance.” The 2030 strategy is supposed to consolidate economic policies among those countries, extend to others, and create a link with Mercosur. Combined, both agreements account for 81 per cent of Latin America’s population and 86 per cent of its GDP. Canada signed a joint declaration of partnership in 2016, a sign of the importance that Canada gives to participating in Latin America’s initiatives. Pro-growth and anti-inflationary fiscal and monetary policies are important, needed measures, but unfortunately, these work at the medium term. What is urgent is the implementation of steps that ensure food and energy security, like unification of policies to limit the increase of prices of basic food—which can be achieved by creating agreements between the Latin American governments and producers and distributors—promotion of autarky, reduction or (even better) elimination of import tariffs, integration of regional-renewable energy policies, new policies that stabilize the fuel prices to avoid passing on increases to the domestic productive sectors and/or to the general population, implementation of temporary subsidies addressed to the most vulnerable groups, and more. Finally, dialogue among all the continent's nations—including Canada—is key to exchanging advice and lived experiences, to reinforce the Americas' self-sufficient and strategic position in the present situation. On June 10, at the Summit of the Americas, Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced close to $145-million in support across the hemisphere for what the government considers main priority areas. That includes $67.9-million to promote gender equality; $26.9-million to address irregular migration and forced displacement; $31.5-million to support health and pandemic response; $17.3-million for projects supporting democratic governance; and $1.6-million to promote digital access and address disinformation. The main problem is that these numbers are a drop in the bucket compared with the hemisphere's future problems. While this funding addresses areas of urgent concern for Latin America, the urgent matter for Canada is irregular migration and forced displacement, which represents 18.5 per cent of the provided resources. Other urgent matters include crime, internal violence, drug trafficking, and corruption, which are not mentioned by the Government of Canada. So, despite the Canadian government's good intentions, the funding impact risks being diluted and diminished. In terms of strategic support for Latin America, the more experienced (and interested) United States has a long history of allocating resources in areas which support its objectives. During the Cold War, it fostered democracy in the region, combatted organized crime, and countered Soviet influence. Throughout the 1990s, the American accent was placed on trade and open markets. Currently, U.S. support for Latin America addresses issues of illicit migration (particularly from Central America) and reinforcing security in countries such as Colombia, Mexico, and the Caribbean, particularly. Other related issues of support include health (especially HIV/AIDS and COVID-19). Regarding migration, U.S. help is linked to the four-year, $4-billion plan to fix the causes of the problem. The current U.S. administration is investing around $2-billion in 2022 in help for Latin America. The United States has declared that this help is directly linked to mitigating the socioeconomic problems created by the pandemic, which is what Canada must also do to support its own goals in the region. In other words, Canada must forget idealism and instead concentrate on investing resources based on facts. Canada has one of the most efficient immigration systems in the world, bringing in around 250,000 or 300,000 new people every year. Canada, however, is not immune to unforeseen situations, like COVID-19, which inevitably creates opportunities for some people who take advantage of circumstances to emigrate, profiting off the system. Controlled immigration adds to the economy and Canada's progress as it ensures its security. Unwanted immigration creates the opposite effect, as it adds economic and social pressures to an already difficult situation. If Canada wants to avoid augmenting the negative effects of an already difficult situation, it must promote these measures among the states of the Americas. After all, in every crisis there is opportunity; may this be the one to increase food and energy independency for Latin America and for all the continent, while also reinforcing Canada’s national security. Othon A. Leon teaches management strategy and administration at HEC, Universite de Montreal, as well as universities on four continents as an invited lecturer, and is currently completing PhD studies in political science (war studies) in Montreal. He is a former Fortune 500 company executive, as well as a soldier. Julian Spencer-Churchill is associate professor of international relations at Concordia University, and former operations officer with the 3 Field Engineer Regiment. He has published extensively on South Asia, conducting research in Pakistan for over 10 years, as well as in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Egypt, and is a consultant. The Hill Times