Policing the precinct requires a principled plan

For the second time in a decade, Parliamentarians are examining security following a “traumatic” incident that impaired the normal functioning of Parliament. In 2015, following the previous year’s intrusion of an armed assailant into Centre Block—and the confusion of interoperability of security personnel and the RCMP on Parliament Hill—the Parliamentary Protective Service (PPS) was created as a hybrid security service under the jurisdiction of the Speakers, but with operational decisions under the control of a senior RCMP officer. Two significant aspects of the legislation creating the PPS were the establishment of a protocol with the RCMP to protect parliamentary privileges, and the expansion of the precinct to include Parliament Hill, a natural buffer zone with defined parliamentary boundaries. In early 2022, the “Freedom Convoy” set up camp just outside the precinct, on Wellington Street. The blockade disrupted the city of Ottawa, and from Parliament’s perspective, access to the precinct for MPs and their staff was impeded through physical obstruction and intimidation. In addition, the PPS was engaged as frontline protectors of the precinct, and witness to numerous public breach-of-peace offences. The Procedure and House Affairs Committee is now examining how to address this latest threat to Parliament’s ability to carry out its constitutional functions without potentially being held hostage to outside threats. The instincts of many are to suggest that the precinct be expanded to include what are currently municipal streets in Ottawa, and possibly some in Gatineau, and presumably the connecting bridges. Concurrently, the committee must necessarily answer the questions of the who and how of policing this increased real estate. It is somewhat perplexing that Parliamentarians are being forced to examine what were clearly policing failures through a parliamentary security lens. In 2014, a gunman was able to shoot a soldier at the National War Memorial and run along Wellington Street (municipal jurisdiction) then across Parliament Hill, which was supposed to be under the watchful eye of the RCMP. In early 2022, the convoy blocked a municipal street, under the jurisdiction of the Ottawa Police Service, and to a lesser extent the RCMP, who failed to enforce innumerable bylaw infractions, and provincial and Criminal Code offences. Parliamentary access and threats to that access, though a serious threat to democratic government and parliamentary independence, were incidental to the continued police failures. Merely pushing the boundaries of the precinct will not address the real police failures and will only establish a new boundary for similar incidents to occur. Not only will such an expansion of the precinct not address the real issue, it will require significant consideration of constitutional issues relating to the transfer of property from provincial to federal responsibility, including not only policing, but also infrastructure, traffic and by-law management, and public access. Policing jurisdiction generally follows physical territory. How to manage any private interests within the “precinct” now under municipal and provincial jurisdiction will have to be addressed. If roadways and other areas have continued unrestricted public access, how will the various police jurisdictions manage the day-to-day personal and business aspects of policing these areas? Presently, the Parliamentary Precinct has a defined boundary with limited access points, which allows for a controlled security environment. Will the “new” expanded precinct require clear definition with controlled access points, and how will this be achieved? Sidewalk chalk drawings from the Rolling Thunder rally are left on roads and barricades along Wellington Street on May 2, 2022. Merely pushing the boundaries of the Parliamentary Precinct will not address the real police failures and will only establish a new boundary for similar incidents to occur, writes Steven Chaplin. The Hill Times photograph by Andrew Meade These intergovernmental issues do not even begin to address the parliamentary issues and concerns that should be the focus of the committee’s work. The first issue concerns the meaning of “precinct” and the privilege to protect and control the precinct, including the exclusion of “strangers.” As a privilege, the matter falls under the jurisdiction of the Speakers, and their sergeants-at-arms. Since privileges belong to the House, Members control their own security. This includes the Parliamentary Buildings and the immediate surrounding grounds. The various internal security measures, since they are closely and totally related to parliamentary space, are protected by privileges recognized by the courts. If the “precinct” is expanded beyond these traditional areas, both the concepts of precinct and its related privileges will be sorely tested and may be inadvertently compromised. The expansion of the precinct to include space until now public and outside the parliamentary sphere changes the nature of the protection from “security” to policing. Security and policing are different. Security focuses on what and who are being secured. Security is performed under the direction of that which is being secured—Parliament. Policing, although it has some aspects of security, is community and public-safety focused, including enforcement of all laws. Responsibility and accountability are to the public through a minister. To expand the role for Parliament’s security to the policing of the expanded precinct will also bring policing into those areas of the existing precinct that are now constitutionally within a parliamentary security model that is based in privileges, which can exclude police, as agents of the state, when necessary. Expanding the precinct and moving towards a policing, rather than security, model could easily lead to the Chambers losing control to the police (the executive) and the courts, against which the privileges of the House were intended to protect. Before sacrificing privilege on the altar of security, it would be best to address the real issues of police failures by requiring the police to assist Parliament in its security. This can be done through better education and operational agreements that would require the police to come to the aid of Parliament, including providing and ensuring access to Parliament for Parliamentarians and staff, and in helping to protect the perimeter of the precinct. In a capital city, this should not be too much to ask of and receive from the police. If more is needed, there could be an amendment to the Criminal Code making it an offence to impede, obstruct, or intimidate a Parliamentarian or staff member from accessing the precinct, and requiring the police to act on any information received from a Speaker that such an occurrence has taken place. No doubt those who may not like these steps will argue that it infringes their constitutional rights of assembly and speech. Any such objection can be met by Parliament asserting its constitutional rights that have been recognized as equally important as Charter rights and as necessary to protect our democratic institutions as the focal point of free speech itself. Steven Chaplin is a fellow at the University of Ottawa’s Public Law Centre and former senior legal counsel of the House of Commons. The Hill Times

Policing the precinct requires a principled plan

Before sacrificing privilege on the altar of security, it would be best to address the real issues of police failures by requiring the police to assist Parliament in its security.

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Policing the precinct requires a principled plan

Before sacrificing privilege on the altar of security, it would be best to address the real issues of police failures by requiring the police to assist Parliament in its security.

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