Is the nature of Arctic co-operation about to change?

Scientific co-operation on Arctic issues crosses state borders and regional boundaries. An intergovernmental forum, the Arctic Council, which comprises the eight Arctic states, six Arctic Indigenous people’s organizations (as permanent participants), and a growing number of observers, provides a way for scientists from Arctic and non-Arctic countries to contribute to its working groups. The Arctic Council is not concerned with matters of sovereignty, territorial claims, military build-up in the region, and economic development. But is the focus on international collaboration in the Arctic about to shift? Last month’s speech by U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo at the council’s 11th meeting, ministerial, in Rovaniemi, Finland, was telling. This is particularly so when considered within the context of a decade of increased scientific co-operation in the Arctic since 2007-2008—International Polar Year—and more than two decades of intergovernmental co-operation on scientific monitoring and assessment. Pompeo took a swipe at the council’s assessment work on biodiversity, conservation, and environmental issues, remarking that it could no longer afford the “luxury of focusing almost exclusively on scientific collaboration, on cultural matters, on environmental research.” True, Pompeo acknowledged the importance of these areas, but he cautioned that a new era for the Arctic is emerging, in which strategic engagement with the region demands a different approach in the face of “new threats to the Arctic and its real estate, and to all of our interests in that region.” Arctic security and sovereignty were at the heart of the secretary of state’s speech. Pointing to Russia and China as the source of these new threats, Pompeo spoke about restoring American security and diplomatic presence through military exercises, rebuilding its icebreaker fleet, growing the Coast Guard, and dedicating a senior military post for Arctic Affairs. He expressed wariness towards Russia’s “violent” territorial ambitions and cast doubt on Chinese intentions, suggesting China could “use its civilian research presence in the Arctic to strengthen its military presence.” The recent announcement that the U.S. intends to re-establish a permanent consular presence in Nuuk reinforces its view that Greenland remains a vital geo-strategic part of the Arctic. Yet, it could be a way for the Americans to keep a careful eye on who is moving in and out of Greenland’s capital—rumours of possible Chinese investment in mining projects and other infrastructure development in Greenland may not go down well in Washington, D.C. Pompeo’s speech suggests the U.S. is taking a new stance on the Arctic, alarmed perhaps by Russia’s increased activities in mega resource projects in its northern regions, as well as reports of a build-up of its military capabilities, and by China’s interest in funding large-scale infrastructure in northern Eurasia. The next two periods of the Arctic Council's leadership could be defined in part by U.S. posturing, or the U.S. warning other Arctic states to be careful of Russia and cautious about China's growing influence in Arctic affairs and economic development. The ministerial marked the end of Finland’s chairmanship. Iceland has taken over for the next two years, after which it will be Russia’s turn. Both countries are enjoying significant Chinese interest and investment. China and Russia have made, what is for them, a smart move to partner on northern infrastructure development, inspired by a belief that climate change affords such opportunities. This is in stark contrast to the absence of investments of a similar scale in the North American Arctic, and that would be of direct benefit to northern communities. The United States position is to think of the Arctic as a space of abundance and opportunity, too, while expressing the need to securitize the region and continuing to problematize the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route by accusing Canada and Russia of making, as Pompeo emphasized, “illegitimate” claims over Arctic waters that lie within their national borders. He also remarked that “challenges in the Arctic aren’t between the United States and Canada,” yet America’s view of the Northwest Passage as an international strait serves to ensure a large part of Canada’s North remains a region of contested sovereignty. This not only refuses to recognize Canadian sovereignty over a large stretch of its northern reaches, it snubs Indigenous sovereignty, bearing in mind that the Northwest Passage lies within Inuit Nunangat, the Canadian Inuit homeland. Canada’s Arctic communities and economies need the right kind of investment, though, Ottawa may not necessarily welcome U.S. involvement in funding large developments projects, such as deep-water harbours, and any future Chinese interest in Arctic Canada would make the Americans extremely jittery. Since the end of the Cold War, international co-operation in the Arctic has been guided largely by an agenda concerned with environmental issues. New forms of economic and business co-operation are now taking shape, which allow the development of partnerships between Arctic and non-Arctic actors. Yet at the same time, much of this is viewed by the US as encroachment, notwithstanding its own ambitions for economic development and trade in the Arctic. Anita Dey Nuttall is the associate director of UAlberta North. The Hill Times